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Americans have no access to law for certain types of problems. Start-
ing with Dean Roscoe Pound, commentators' have documented the
reasons for lack of access: entry to the legal system demands an amount
of time, money, and knowledge that many people do not have;2 the
courts have contrived devices to control their dockets; 3 and certain
harms have not been accorded a legal remedy.4 Proposed reforms to
j- Professor of Anthropology, University of California, Berkeley. The author wishes to
thank Christopher Shugart for invaluable assistance in the preparation of this article. For
a more complete discussion of the subject of this article, see No Access to Law (L. Nader
ed. forthcoming); in many respects, law review form is not conducive to the expression and
development of ideas by persons trained in other disciplines.
1. E.g., Fox, Providing Legal Services for the Middle Class in Civil Matters: The
Problems, the Duty, and a Solution, 26 U. PITr. L. REv. 811 (1965); Maguire, Poverty and
Civil Litigation, 36 HARv. L. Rav. 361 (1923); Pound, The Administration of Justice in
the Modern City, 26 HARv. L. REv. 302 (1913).
2. Pound, supra note 1, at 310-11. Commentators have observed that entry into the
legal system also demands a willingness to submit to a complex and cumbersome pro-
cedure that may fail to address underlying problems and may prevent disputants from
acquiring quick response after telling their own stories. E.g., AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
REPORT OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON MINOR DISPUTES RESOLUTION 2 (1977) (prepared
by F. Sander).
3. See Friedman, Legal Rules and the Process of Social Change, 19 STAN. L. REV. 786,
798-810 (1967) (reviewing jurisdictional and procedural rules developed by legal system to
control volume of litigation). But cf. Sykes, Cases, Courts, and Congestion, in L4,w IN
CULTURE AND SOCIETY (L. Nader ed. 1969) (judicial autonomy limits judges' desires to
develop administrative devices to control dockets).
4. Some consumer complaints concern risks of harm that have not yet occurred but that
still cause constant worry. See p. 1002 infra. In addition, although consumers may be
misled by marketing schemes even if they do not complete a transaction, actual economic
injury is usually required to sustain a legal cause of action. See Rice, Remedies, En.
forcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer Transactions Problems, 48 B.U. L.
REv. 559, 561 (1968).
Although judicial and legislative inroads have expanded legal protection for consumers
during the past two decades, D. RICE, CONSUMER TRANSACrIONS 86-329 (1975), many such
reforms have been criticized as inadequate. The Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act,
for example, is designed to provide restitution to consumers harmed by abusive sales
practices, but it has been criticized for imposing sanctions only against knowing violations
and for failing to create balanced incentives for settlement. Rice, Uniform Consumer
Sales Practices Act-Damage Remedies: The NCCUSL Giveth and Taketh Away, 67 Nw.
U.L. REv. 369, 375-82 (1972). Moreover, burdensome time limitations and costs of meeting
notice requirements impede class action suits under this and other legislative provisions.
See McCall, Due Process and Consumer Protection: Concepts and Realities in Procedure
and Substance-Class Action Issues, 25 HASTINrs L.J. 1351 (1974).
The Truth-in-Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677 (1976), is designed to guard against
deceptive credit practices, but critics note the shortcomings resulting from its reliance on
disclosure requirements. E.g., Kripke, Gesture and Reality in Consumer Credit Reform, 44
N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 2-9, 51-52 (1969). The increasing stringency of products liability law
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address access problems have at times stimulated broad political move-
ments. Thus, the small claims court movement, 5 the regulatory move-
ment,0 the legal services movement, including federally funded legal
assistance and prepaid legal services, 7 and the public-interest move-
ment,s have each promised to provide previously unavailable legal help.
None of these efforts alone, nor all of them combined, has satisfied
the demand for access to legal relief which, by the turn of the century,
became acute for a range of problems arising in the everyday lives of
individuals.
Scholarly discussions of the problem of access, and reform proposals,
have seldom focused on what people actually do when they have com-
plaints but no access to law. Citizen action-and inaction-outside the
legal system must be reviewed to determine whether the inaccessibility
of legal relief for some problems is a serious deficiency. One particular
class of cases commonly falls outside the channels of access to law in
this country-complaints about the defects in purchased items and
public services that interfere with life as usual and that often go un-
offers little assistance to consumers with problems that are frequent and relatively inex-
pensive. D. RICE, supra, at vii.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) regulates deceptive and abusive consumer prac-
tices, but the Commission's focus on halting undesired conduct and its own workload and
bureaucratic delays limit its ability to provide effective redress for individual consumers.
See, e.g., Lurie, Consumer Complaints: A Proposed Federal Trade Regulation Rule, 5 J. L.
REF. 426 (1972). Thus, even when legal relief may be available for some of the complaints
described in this article, the practical barriers to effective redress can effectively interfere
with access to law.
5. For a comprehensive discussion of the literature on small claims, see Yngvesson &
Hennessey, Small Claims, Complex Disputes: A Review of the Small Claims Literature, 9
LAw & Soc'Y REv. 219 (1975). Recent studies criticize the enforcement process used by
small claims courts. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, supra note 2, at 309.
6. See D. RICE, supra note 4, at 6-10; R. WIEBE, THE SEARCH FOR ORDER 164-95 (1967).
For discussions of current movements to reform regulatory efforts, see COMMIssION ON
LAW AND THE ECONOMY, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, FEDERAL REGULATION: ROADS TO
REFORM (1978) (exposure draft); Bruff, Presidential Power and Administrative Rulemak-
ing, 88 YALE L.J. 451, 454-56 (1979).
7. Approximately 320 legal services programs in local communities throughout the
country serve 29 million Americans who live at or below the poverty threshold de-
termined by the Office of Management and Budget. Ehrlich, Giving Low-Income
Americans Minimum Access to Legal Services, 64 A.B.A.J. 696, 696-97 (1978). The Legal
Services Corporation was established to ensure that those who are otherwise unable to
afford legal assistance have access to it. Id.
Group legal services plans seek to provide a range of legal services to middle-income
recipients. Like group medical insurance, these plans spread the cost among a large
number of people in order to minimize the cost to the individual participant. In August
1976, approximately 125 such plans covered an estimated 1,250,000 members from $12 to
$250 per member yearly. Murphy, The Prepaid Legal Services Picture, 62 A.B.A.J. 1569,
1570 (1976). For a description of various bar-sponsored prepaid legal service plans, see
SPECIAL COMMISSION ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, REVISED
HANDBOOK ON PREPAID LEGAL SERVICES (1972).
8. See Note, The New Public Interest Lawyers, 79 YALE L.J. 1069 (1970).
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corrected. What do Americans do with such complaints when they
perceive that they cannot obtain legal relief?9
This article considers the importance of these complaints and ex-
amines an array of alternatives to the legal system that has developed
to process consumer and citizen grievances. A pervasive pattern of un-
satisfied complaints and inadequate relief emerges from research on
extrajudicial complaint settings. 10 The article suggests some of the
causes and societal consequences of this pattern of failure;" it con-
cludes that, at least in this country, ultimate access to the legal system
is crucial if extralegal processes are ever to provide effective relief for
consumer and citizen complaints.
I. Complaints about "Little Injustices"
A. Why Care About Complaints?
One reason for an interest in little injustices is that people care about
them; they are a great part of everyday living in a consumption-oriented
society. Another reason for an interest in such complaints is that
ignoring them encourages criminal behavior: when complaints go un-
addressed, producers are in effect stealing small amounts from large
numbers of people and escaping sanctions for such behavior. Tradi-
tional techniques for dealing with unfair treatment simply are no
longer in use. English towns in the Middle Ages could rely heavily on
public opinion to deter abuses in the marketplace; dishonest craftsmen
and merchants were paraded through the streets and placed in stocks for
all to see, and their wares were publicly burned.' 2 In a modern, in-
dustrialized society dominated by large corporations and sprawling gov-
ernmental bureaucracies, public opinion and interpersonal ties can no
9. Consumer dissatisfaction is increasing. A survey of consumer attitudes commissioned
by the Sentry Insurance Co. in 1976 found that 61% of consumers interviewed thought
that the quality of goods and services had worsened in the preceding 10 years, and 78%
said that products did not last as long as they did a decade ago. Sentry Insurance Co.,
Consumerism at the Crossroads 22, 23 (July 1976) (available from Sentry Insurance Co.,
Stevens Point, Wis.).
10. This article draws on research conducted over the past eight years. See p. 1003
infra.
11. For one judicial appraisal of causes and consequences, see Johnson v. Avery, 393
U.S. 483, 491 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring):
The increasing complexities of our governmental apparatus at both the local and
the federal levels have made it difficult for a person to process a claim or even to
make a complaint. Social security is a virtual maze; the hierarchy that governs urban
housing is often so intricate that it takes an expert to know what agency has jurisdic-
tion over a particular complaint; the office to call or official to see for noise abate-
ment, for a broken sewer line, or a fallen tree is a mystery to many in our metro-
politan areas.
12. Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor, 40 YALE L.J. 1133, 1152 (1931).
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longer serve as effective mechanisms of social control. The increasing
availability and complexity of goods and services create more occasions
for things to go wrong, such as defects in products and delays in the
provision of public services.
Lacking other effective methods for solving such problems, a citizen
may hope for relief from the legal system. Yet individual complaints
about consumer goods and governmental benefits seldom reach courts.13
Even if there is a plausible legal argument, the money, time, and
knowledge necessary to pursue a claim through official legal channels
may be beyond the claimant's reach. The consumer suffers from a
doubly disadvantaged position: he has to bear the full cost of legal fees,
while businesses can deduct litigation costs as a business expense14 and
the public bureaucracy's legal costs are ultimately paid by the con-
sumer.
Speaking more generally, the legal system is seldom responsive in a
complex industrial society to issues that affect the quality of everyday
life.15 In fact, the legal system may define a problem as relatively un-
important if the monetary amount in controversy is small, if one of the
parties is too poor to wage a legal battle, or if the issue itself simply
seems to be trivial.10 Yet from other perspectives, such problems are
important. From the vantage point of a low-income family expecting a
baby, the landlord's failure to return a security deposit could impose
severe damage to the family's well-being.' 7 If the legal system is un-
13. Many complaints seldom reach any third party. See Best & Andreasen, Consumer
Response to Unsatisfactory Purchases: A Survey of Perceiving Defects, Voicing Complaints,
and Obtaining Redress, 11 LAw & Soc'y Rav. 701, 713-14 (1977) (only 3.7% voiced com-
plaints studied reached any third party; only 16% of those brought to third parties were
brought to lawyer or court).
14. Legal expenses incurred in producing or collecting income and managing income-
producing property are deductible under I.R.C. § 212. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Estate of
Bartholomew, 4 T.C. 349, appeal dismissed, 151 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1945).
15. See THE DISPUTING PROCESS: LAw IN TEN SOCIETIES 38 (L. Nader & H. Todd eds.
1978); L. Nader & Combs-Schilling, Restitution in Cross-Cultural Perspective, in RMsTITU-
TION AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 27 (J. Hudson & B. Galaway eds. 1977).
16. See R. SMITH, JuSTIcE AND THE POOR 41 (1924) ("Our legal system has taken too
literally the ancient maxim, 'de minimis non curat lex.' ")
17. Chief Justice Burger has observed:
[W]e do not need to call on psychiatrists or clinical psychologists to tell us that a
sense of injustice rankles and festers in the human breast and the dollar value of the
conflict is not always the measure of tension and irritation produced. A landlord
who delays unduly in repairing a defective radiator or refrigerator can produce un-
happy chain reactions on children and adults. A defective roofing or siding job on
the home, defective work on the family car sometimes can produce serious con-
sequences comparable to those of a major illness.
Burger, Our Vicious Legal Spiral, JUDGES' J., Fall 1977, at 48; see SMALL CLAIMS STUDY
GROUP, LITTLE INJUSTICEs: SMALL CLAIMS COURTS AND THE AMERICAN CONSUMER 5 (1972)
(J. Weiss, project director) ("The person of modest income, barred from seeking redress
for a real grievance by the cost of legal assistance, may feel a sense of powerlessness just
as great as the unattended patient.")
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responsive to such everyday problems, it becomes irrelevant to its
citizens. If the alternatives to legal relief are also ineffective, the in-
adequacy of law is felt even more profoundly.'8 What may seem to be a
minor problem thus can be significant because its resolution-or lack
thereof-influences people's attitudes about law and social order.
Further, complaints about little injustices may serve to signal broader
problems affecting many people. Even though companies may tend to
believe that people use general complaints as a strategy to solve an in-
dividual problem, people often complain in order to encourage the
company to change its production policy or improve the quality of its
product. 19 A company that ignores or misunderstands such complaints
may fail to perceive the seriousness of underlying product defects. Such
was the case when one woman complained to a company that made
diapers that distintegrated in use. She asked that the company do some-
thing to guard against the risk that a child might swallow a piece of
diaper and choke to death; she received in response a new box of
diapers.20
An examination of numerous similar individual complaints in the
aggregate may expose the extent of a problem and highlight the need
for a systemic response. Consumer complaints can alert regulatory
agencies to the widespread presence of product defects. For example,
problems encountered by women and minorities who attempt to obtain
credit can become apparent through examination of the level of in-
dividual complaints registered at the FTC.2 1 If all individual com-
18. In this sense, judicial and extrajudicial mechanisms can be seen as parts of one
interrelated system of social control; together, they define the availability of solutions to
people's problems.
19. A review of over 5,000 complaint letters revealed that people of all socioeconomic
brackets write such letters and that they are often motivated by a sense of injustice and a
desire to improve products, as well as by a desire to have their own loss redressed. See L.
Nader, Introduction to No Access to Law (L. Nader ed. forthcoming) [hereinafter cited
without cross-references as No Access to Law].
20. Id. A similarly inadequate response occurred when a complainant convinced the
New York Department of Consumer Affairs to respond to a company's fraudulent disc-
brake special. The Department simply imposed a $50 fine on the company; it did not
put an end to the scheme. Id.
21. The FTC, the agency with overall enforcement authority under the Equal Credit
Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691c(c) (1976), receives consumer complaints and inquiries
regarding the vast majority of the creditors affected by the Act; other complaints are
directed to other agencies. Although the FTC does not intervene in individual disputes
regarding credit rejections, it responds to consumer inquiries. The agency files all in-
quiries and complaints under the complainant's name, the name of the creditor, and the
statutory provision that governs the problem described in the complaint. Although the
FTC does not tabulate complaints, FTC attorneys try to investigate creditors about whom
large numbers of complaints accumulate or who appear to be engaged in particularly
egregious violations. Telephone Interview with Jean Noonan, attorney, Division of Credit,
FTC (Feb. 5, 1979).
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plaints to congressional representatives about social security were
channeled from case-work staff to legislative action, perhaps the entire
benefit system would be streamlined. This aggregate approach to in-
dividual complaints is seldom taken, however, partly because politicians
benefit personally from the handling of cases individually and because
complainants rarely see themselves as members of a class sharing the
same problems.
B. Studying Complaints
A systematic study of people who voice complaints in extrajudicial
settings was launched eight years ago. 22 Locating complainants for study
is difficult because they are dispersed and often hidden by virtue of the
confidentiality maintained by companies and nonjudicial dispute-
settlement mechanisms. 23 After reviewing several hundred letters sent
to a national citizen-action organization, 24 the study focused on the
complainant's perspective on organizations whose manifest goal is to
handle complaints. A team of researchers used participant-observation
methods and other data-gathering techniques employed by anthro-
pologists to acquire a panoramic view of the range of mechanisms that
has been developed to handle complaints about products and services.
In recent years, such programs have sprouted in the form of city con-
sumer departments, consumer fraud divisions of attorneys general
offices, private company toll-free hotlines, advertising review boards,
professional associations, consumer complaints centers, media action
lines, and neighborhood legal services. Some institutions developed by
the business community were selected for detailed examination: a
branch of the Better Business Bureau (BBB),25 the consumer-action
22. Following preliminary study, in 1973 a proposal was submitted to the Carnegie
Corporation from the Center for the Study of Responsive Law in Washington, D.C., for
the establishment of a Consumer Complaint Research Center. The purposes of such a
research center were to learn in greater detail about the actual operation of existing
grievance mechanisms and to determine American attitudes about these processes. The
work was conducted jointly by the Center and the University of California, Berkeley.
23. As testimony to the attempt of companies to keep complaints secret, General
Motors displayed avid interest in buying 19 boxes of microfilmed complaint letters
originally sent to the Chevrolet customer relations department that accidentally wound up
in the hands of two scrap dealers. It would be overgenerous to presume that GM quickly
paid $20,000 out of a desire to better understand the nature of customer dissatisfaction.
See San Francisco Chronicle, Apr. 29, 1971, at 2, col. 1.
24. Freedman, "Dear Mr. Nader": A Study of Consumer Complaint Letters, in No
Access to Law. Freedman's study analyzes recurrent patterns in several hundred com-
plaint letters written directly to Ralph Nader, or written to corporations or government
agencies with carbon copies sent to Mr. Nader.
25. Eaton, The Better Business Bureau: "The Voice of the People in the Marketplace,"
in No Access to Law. Beginning in 1971, Eaton analyzed the performance of a BBB
branch. Her study substantiates a congressman's findings that documented the tension
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panels sponsored by six trade associations,2 6 and the complaint-manage-
ment systems developed by six urban department stores to satisfy steady
customers.2 7 The open-return policy adopted by some of these stores
was also examined. 2 In addition, the research team studied the Public
Review Board of the United Auto Workers-another institution man-
aged directly by the organization complained about.29 Although the
union does not deal with either product or service complaints, its board
is reputed to be the best developed mechanism for handling worker-
between the BBB's financial dependence on local businesses and its goal of serving con-
sumers. See 117 CONG. REGc. 47,781 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Rosenthal Report].
The BBB remains one of the most frequently used complaint-processing mechanisms.
A 1974 Roper Report asked consumers where they would turn should they fail to get
satisfaction from a seller or manufacturer. Over 50% responded that they would go to
the BBB. CONFERENCE BOARD, THE CONSUMER AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT: ORGANIZATIONS AND
FUNCTIONS 6 (1973); see D. KING & K. McEvoy, A NATIONAL SURVEY OF THE COMPLAINT-
HANDLING PROCEDURES USED BY CONSUMERS (1976) (Nat'l Technical Information Serv., U.S.
Commerce Dep't) (BBB more familiar to consumers than 19 of 21 public and private
organizations; only Post Office and Social Security Administration better known).
26. Greenberg & Stanton, Business Groups, Consumer Problems: The Contradiction of
Trade Association Complaint Handling, in No Access to Law. The research for this study
was conducted from 1974 to 1976.
Consumer action panels aim to decrease overt dissatisfaction at the smallest cost and
without alienating the businesses that constitute their memberships. Their purpose is to
forestall government regulation through industry self-regulation. Id. For another discus-
sion of complaint handling by trade associations, see Jones & Boyer, Improving the Quality
of the Marketplace: The Need for Better Consumer Remedies, 40 GEO. WASH. L. REv.
357, 370-72 (1972).
27. Karikas & Rosenwasser, The Department Store: Face-to-Face Complaint Manage-
ment, in No Access to Law. This study was carried out in 1972. The research is particu-
larly interesting because it deals with complaints directed against the seller. One survey
found that 87% of households that complained went to the seller first. See D. KING & K.
McEvoY, supra note 25, at 10. Best and Andreasen found that only 3.7% of all complaints
were taken to third parties, and noted that "[t]he limited role of third parties suggests
that our first priority should be improvement in the way sellers handle complaints." Best
& Andreasen, supra note 13, at 132.
28. Despite the commonly expressed fear that an open-return policy would produce
an avalanche of unsubstantiated complaints that in turn would reduce corporate profits,
the study's preliminary review of retailers and manufacturers found numerous businesses
that have maintained such a policy and still earned respectable profits. E.g., Telephone
Interview with Gordon Serman, former president of Midas Muffler (Apr. 22, 1974); In-
terview with regional spokesman, Sears Roebuck, Inc. (Oakland, Cal., Oct. 3, 1978). Sears
Roebuck has used an open-return policy since the 1890s, and has also instituted a system
for identifying and dealing with patterns of complaints. Id. Reports on every complaint
are sent to the Sears headquarters in Chicago and compiled. Sears then tries to work with
manufacturers to improve products that continually fail to satisfy customers. The open-
return system gives each store an increased incentive to carry only products that will
please. Id.
29. See Combs-Schilling, Grieving and Feuding: The Organizational Dilemma of a
Labor Union, in No Access to Law.
Combs-Schilling studied the UAW's formal mechanisms for handling complaints during
two separate periods: in 1973, when the auto industry was in relatively good health, and
in 1975, when it was not. In describing the procedures used for processing complaints,
she notes that they resemble American legal procedures in their formality and com-
plexity: they include the initiation of charges, the choosing of a trial committee, a trial,




union complaints; it was chosen for study with the hope that some of
its ideas could be applied to the handling of consumer complaints.
Other complaint-processing devices use an intermediary to act as a
clearinghouse, troubleshooter, or watchdog. Two such programs re-
ceived close consideration: the handling of constituent complaints by
the district office of a popular United States congressman, 30 and the
Policy Service Bureau (PSB) of the California Department of Insur-
ance. 31 San Francisco Consumer Action, a private voluntary organiza-
tion created to help citizens with their grievances, was also researched
in depth. 32 Another study compared a business organization, a private
voluntary organization, and a city government organization as they
operate in a Washington, D.C. ghetto.33 Finally, four media action lines
that solicit and pursue complaints were examined.34
Each of these techniques is devoted to receiving and responding to
an individual's dissatisfaction with a product or service; each is sup-
posed to offer speedy, simple, and inexpensive access to relief. At
various times, some of the devices have successfully satisfied individual
complainants. Department-store customers-especially those with good
credit records-who persist in their complaints by confronting upper-
level management can obtain favorable resolution.35 The congressman's
wide network of influential contacts enabled him to process constituent
complaints effectively. 36 San Francisco Consumer Action added pro-
30. Karikas, Solving Problems in Philadelphia: An Ethnography of a Congressional
District Office, in No Access to Law; see W. GELLHORN, WHEN AMERICANS COMPLAIN:
GOVERNMENTAL GRIEVANCE PROCEDURES (1966). Congressman William Barrett, who held
office from 1945 to 1946 and from 1949 until his death in 1976, operated in the style of
the political machine that in the past prevailed in many cohesive ethnic communities in
American cities. Machine politics were based on reciprocal favors within the local ward:
Barrett's constituents delivered the votes in return for his personal aid. Id.
31. See Serber, Resolution or Rhetoric: Managing Complaints in the California De-
partment of Insurance, in No Access to Law. Research on the Department was com-
pleted during 1971 and 1972. The Insurance Department is the only agency, public or
private, in California that takes complaints about insurance; it is authorized to suspend
an insurer's state certification upon a finding of unfair practices. Most of the Department's
work is conducted by an insurance officer who mediates between the customer and the
company. Id.
32. See Wilson & Brydolf, Grass Roots Solutions: San Francisco Consumer Action, in
No Access to Law. A study by Wilson in 1973 was followed up three years later by
Brydolf. The organization had undergone significant changes during that time. Id.
33. Greenberg, Easy Terms, Hard Times: Complaint Handling in the Ghetto, in No
Access to Law (comparing Consumer Development Group and Service Area Committee
(SAC), and a department store, all in Washington, D.C.).
34. Mattice, Media in the Middle: A Study of the Mass Media Complaint Managers, in
No Access to Law. The media action lines studied included one managed by a newspaper,
one associated with a television station, and two associated with radio stations. The re-
search was initiated in 1972. By the early 1970s, over 350 action-line columns appeared
in newspapers alone. Id.
35. Karikas & Rosenwasser, supra note 27.
36. Karikas, supra note 30.
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grams to its switchboard hotline to promote public education, train
consumers to help themselves, and undertake political lobbying demon-
strations.3t Public faith in the organization was always very high; in a
survey, eighty-eight percent of complainants polled said that they
trusted the organization.3 8 Media action lines sometimes have pub-
licized recurrent complaints about business and government, and have
stimulated corrective action.39
Yet in spite of particular successes of some of these organizations, in
general a rather dismal pattern emerges from the study. Instead of
providing easy access to swift relief, many of the programs obstruct the
complainants' path with complex procedures40 and repeated delays. 41
Some fail to disclose to the complainant the steps necessary in order
to process a grievance; 42 some department stores even hide their cus-
tomer-service offices from view.43 Intermediary organizations are often
understaffed, underfinanced, and overworked, 44 and the resulting back-
logs and inefficiency can discourage consumers from pressing their
complaints. 45 There is evidence that some organizations deliberately
dissuade individuals from pursuing relief.4" In sum, complaint-process-
ing methods often make it so difficult for complainants to persist that
they are likely to "lump it," '4 and even likely to avoid raising claims
in the future. 48
37. Wilson & Brydolf, suPra note 32.
38. Id.
39. Mattice, supra note 34.
40. E.g., Combs-Schilling, supra note 29 (union workers may be discouraged by paper-
work involved in trial-type complaint procedures).
41. E.g., Greenberg & Stanton, supra note 26 (resolution of complaints by trade as-
sociation panels takes months, "especially when the panels needlessly send consumers back
to dealers or manufacturers").
42. Combs-Schilling, supra note 29 (union workers uninformed about available pro-
cedures); Greenberg 8: Stanton, supra note 26 (trade association panels do not systematically
inform unsatisfied complainants that they can continue to pursue relief).
43. Karikas & Rosenwasser, supra note 27 (complaint departments often on top floor of
store; customer service sign at one store partially hidden).
44. E.g., Serber, supra note 31.
45. Id.
46. Greenberg, supra note 33 (ghetto store that sells on credit and deals with cus-
tomer complaints about payment terms uses intimidation as last resort to prevent customer
from complaining to third party); see Eaton, supra note 25; Greenberg & Stanton, supra
note 26.
47. "Lumping it" refers to the failure of an aggrieved party to press his complaint so
that the problem that gave rise to the disagreement is ignored. Felstiner, Influences of
Social Organization on Dispute Processing, 9 LAW & Soc'y REv. 63-94 (1974). This behavior
is typical of persons who lack access to information or to law, and persons who perceive
that the costs of pursuing a complaint are too high or that the potential gains are too
low. See Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of
Legal Change, 9 LAw & Soc'Y REv. 95, 124-25 (1974).
48. The self-reported success rates of complaint organizations are thus often misleading
because of the large number of persons who initially seek assistance and then drop out. In
a 1975 report, for example, one trade-association complaint panel claimed that 97% of
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A survey of 2,419 respondents in 34 cities was conducted in 1975 in
order to discover how consumers respond to unsatisfactory purchases. 49
A remarkable finding was that buyers did not complain at all about
57.7% of their problems that concerned more than only price. In
30.7% of the cases in which buyers perceived problems, the only com-
plaint made was to the seller. In only 1.2%, did the buyer take his
grievance to a third party. One might think there was no need to resort
to third parties because the sellers were so quick to give redress, but the
data show otherwise. Only 56.5o of the voiced complaints-disregard-
ing the few that concerned only price-were settled to the satisfaction
of the purchaser. This means that many consumers who complained to
the seller without success did not contact a third party. One reason for
consumer reluctance to complain to third parties is the improbability
of success.
The failure to devise successful processes to receive and respond to
complaints is even more severe when measured against the societal
benefit that could accrue if complaints were handled satisfactorily.
Besides resolving individual grievances quickly and fairly, an ideal
complaint-handling system would disclose aggregate patterns of abuse
or injustice and would support systemic reform. An ideal system would
improve the quality of goods and services by alerting producers about
defects and by providing administrative agencies with data to guide
and support enforcement. The systems that exist, however, do not
prevent or deter abuses. At best, they satisfy isolated individuals0 and
only rarely is systematic reform stimulated.
The remainder of this article examines the results of our study which
revealed the inadequacy of complaint processes in nonjudicial settings.
It identifies competing constituencies and structural flaws that con-
tribute to the limited responsiveness of complaint-handling systems.
II. Constraints on Third-Party Complaint Handlers
A few years ago I attended a ceremony in San Francisco to celebrate
the opening of a complaint-mobile by the city district attorney's office.
its cases were resolved during the first phase of its procedures. Greenberg & Stanton,
supra note 26. Less than half, however, were actually resolved in a way that the com-
plainants considered satisfactory. Id.; cf. R. Darmstadter, All You Ever Want to Know
About the Office of Consumer Affairs (unpublished 1973) (on file with Yale Law Journal)
(White House Consumer Office labeled complaint procedure "success" whenever company
responded to inquiry).
49. See Best & Andreasen, supra note 13.
50. See, e.g., Karikas & Rosenwasser, supra note 27 (individual complaints at department
stores rarely affect general store policy and rarely reach manufacturers); Karikas, supra
note 30 (congressman handled cases on isolated basis and did nothing to create lasting
changes that would avoid identical future complaints).
1007
The Yale Law Journal
On a city street, the public was invited to present their complaints-
access was certainly easy. An agitated woman hurried forward and sat
down in front of the complaint handler. "I haven't received my social
security check for six months," she said. The complaint handler put
down her pencil: "I'm sorry, we don't handle social security problems."
The woman walked away. There was a problem of misleading ad-
vertising; the sign on the truck did read "Complaint-Mobile."
This anecdote is not an isolated example. It summarizes problems
inherent in most complaint-handling devices: they are not tailored to
the needs of individual users. False expectations are encouraged in the
advertising and labeling of complaint mechanisms. Those expectations
are disappointed in the actual provision of services. This pattern per-
haps should not be surprising. It replicates the problems of consumer
goods and services that give rise to complaints. From the automobile
industry5 to public educational systems,52 technology often is not
designed to meet the needs or constraints of the individual user.
The plight of the consumer to some extent was created by the dis-
integration of a market system of exchanges between parties having
equal power and information. 53 Government regulation designed to
protect the consumer constitutes one attempt to compensate for market
disintegration.54 Complaint mechanisms, at least overtly, constitute
another. The development of these mechanisms suggests that in-
dividuals need the additional leverage offered by intermediaries to
register their interests and to obtain satisfaction. On closer examina-
tion, however, it appears that complaint handlers in fact do not com-
pensate for the inequalities that impair the operation of a market
system. Instead, complaint handlers reinforce those inequalities and
respond to interests other than those of individual complainants.
Seldom funded or created by complainants, complaint mechanisms are
able to survive without responding fully or successfully to consumer or
citizen grievances. As a result, most extrajudicial settings for resolving
consumer and citizen complaints deliberately or unintentionally dis-
courage complainants and diffuse pressures for systemic change.
51. See R. NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED (1965) (describing design deficiencies of
Corvair and Mustang automobiles).
52. See, e.g., D. TYAK, THE ONE BEST SYSTEM 39-59 (1974) (historical roots of educa-
tional systems designed to promote order and conformity).
53. For general discussions of the rise of giant corporations and the transformation of
the traditional market system, see J. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 38-51
(1973); R. HEILBRONER, THE WORDLY PHILOSOPHERS 252-76 (2d ed. 1961); G. LODGE, THE
NEW AMERICAN IDEOLOGY 234-64 (1975).
54. See, e.g., Fair Packaging and Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1451-1461 (1976); Truth in
Lending Act, id. §§ 1601-1677; M. WVEIDENBAUM, BUSINESS, GOVERNMENT AND THE PUBLIC
24-59 (1977) (reviewing consumer-product regulation).
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A. Powerful Interests v. Individual Complainants
Organizations are attentive to the people who provide for their fund-
ing and continued survival. When these supporting organizations have
interests contrary to those of complainants, the complaint mechanisms
will have at best limited effectiveness. Even absent conflicting interests,
patrons who do not share the goals of complainants can distract the
organization from satisfying complainants. This pattern appears in
media action lines, in self-regulation efforts of the business community,
and in programs sponsored by governmental agencies.
Media action lines have the capacity to act as intermediaries, to take
advantage of informal networks of favors, to create bad publicity, and
to translate complaints into calls for general reform.55 Yet, regardless
of the action line's independence from the parent newspaper or broad-
caster, it will be constrained by the goals of its media host: pleasing the
audience and the advertisers. Although obtaining a solid victory for a
consumer can make good news, complaints may be rejected because
they are repetitive and no longer engage the audience.56 Furthermore,
the interests of advertisers can ultimately supervene those of both the
audience and the consumer. The staff of one television action line was
told to discontinue the use of company names because advertisers felt
threatened.57 An auto association in Atlanta reacted to a local television
station's proconsumer broadcasts with a one-year advertising boycott.58
Thus, media action lines may disregard the interests of consumers in
order to maintain their primary audience and to avoid antagonizing
their benefactors, the business community.
Self-regulation efforts established by the business community in
response to consumer complaints are even more directly tied to the
55. Mattice, supra note 34. The intermediary role served by action lines resembles a
function performed in other legal systems. See Barton, Igugao Law, 15 U. CAL. PUBLICA-
TIONS IN AM. ARCHAEOLOGY & ETHNOLOGY 1, 57-58 (1919) (all important transactions con-
summated with aid of intermediary). For example, -"Action 4," part of a television news
program in New York City, had trouble convincing a department store to settle con-
sumer complaints until reporter Betty Furness discussed the problem on the air. N.Y.
Times, Mar. 29, 1976, at 55, col. I.
56. An advertisement placed in a newspaper by "Action 7" of KGO-TV in San
Francisco announced that the station was "looking for unusual problems that can't seem
to get resolved in usual ways." San Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 28, 1972, at 11, col. 5.
57. NEWSWEEK, Sept. 15, 1975, at 69-70. In another instance, a local lawyer worried
that a newspaper action line was treading too close to the practice of law. He brought
the issue to the state bar association; in response, the newspaper adopted the policy of
excluding legal items from its action-line column. Bowler, Action Line Gets Answers,
COLUM. JOURNALIsM REV., July/Aug. 1971, at 29, 32. One observer has suggested that to
be safe, action lines should avoid giving specific answers to individuals' questions and
instead devote themselves to general advice. See EDITOR & PUBLISHER, Nov. 15, 1969, at 56.
58. NEWSWEEK, Sept. 15, 1975, at 69-70.
1009
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 88: 998, 1979
interests of the businesses about which complaints are received.59 Un-
less independent nonbusiness members are included in the governing
structure of a complaint-processing organization, ° or unless its work is
recorded on an open public record, such an organization has little in-
centive or power to address complaints by responsibly incorporating the
consumer perspective.
Complaint mechanisms established and funded by government avoid
the immediate pressure of conflicting interests. Yet, even though funds
come from the taxpayer, they are funneled through legislatures in
which business lobbies exert persistent influence. 61 Key positions in
public agencies are often filled by persons with close ties to the busi-
nesses under regulation . 2 An informal channel may exist between
jobs in an agency and jobs in the industry under surveillance. Staff
loyalties are also colored by past experiences or hopes of future em-
ployment. 3 In addition, mechanisms established by government to
deal with complaints about government services resemble private in-
dustry efforts at self-regulation. Dependent on the government for its
continued existence, a public complaint agency has little or no incen-
tive to respond to grievances, and instead may divide the community,
59. Motivated by dwindling consumer confidence and by hopes of forestalling govern-
ment regulation, business groups created and financed the BBB and trade-association
complaint mechanisms. See Rosenthal Report, supra note 25, at 47,782 (describing origin
of BBB); Greenberg & Stanton, supra note 26 (describing trade association devices). The
personnel of these organizations may be ardent consumer advocates, but their activities
will be influenced by the continuing financial support of the businesses they are supposed
to monitor. Moreover, the BBB is accorded little power; it forwards consumer complaints
to the offending business, but cannot compel settlement. Instead, it relies on the business
to resolve complaints voluntarily. Eaton, supra note 25.
Similarly, consumer action panels sponsored by trade associations chiefly transmit
complaints from the consumer to the company and can only issue nonbinding, advisory
opinions. The panels attempt to decrease consumer dissatisfaction without alienating the
businesses that constitute their membership. Thus, they exist primarily to serve trade
association members, not consumers. Greenberg & Stanton, supra note 26.
60. An exceptional trade-association program, the Office of the Impartial Chairman
(OIC), was authorized to resolve disputes within the moving industry in New York City
through the use of binding arbitration. It helped to prevent complaints by screening the
estimates of moving costs submitted by members of the industry. This organization
differed in one crucial way from most trade association programs: it was set up jointly by
the mover's trade association and a local chapter of the Teamsters Union. Responsive to
a different constituency, OIC was given more power and independence than other systems,
and was better equipped to respond to consumer interests. Greenberg & Stanton, supra
note 26.
61. 3 SENATE COMM. ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, 95TH CONG., 1ST SaSS., STUDY ON
FEDERAL REGULATION 1-22 (Comm. Print. 1977) (describing lobbying expenditures).
62. See R. NOLL, REFORMING REGULATION 99-100 (1971); Robinson, The Federal Com-
munications Commission: An Essay On Regulatory Watchdogs, 64 VA. L. Rv. 169, 185-93
(1978) (even when appointees are not from regulated industry, they seldom represent
public interests; even if regulators are not captured by industry, regulation itself often is).
63. Serber, supra note 31 (personal and political connections between California's
insurance-regulating agency and regulated insurance companies).
1010
Disputing Without Law
lower complainants' expectations, and continue to be perceived as
legitimate despite its inadequate resolution of complaints.
6 4
B. Monopoly, Power, and Public Scrutiny
A complaint mechanism may also be able to insulate itself from
complainants by monopolizing complaints. 5 It may be the only organi-
zation receiving complaints in a given area or it may be sponsored by
the only producer of the goods or services that engender complaints. A
store that sells on credit and deals with customer complaints about pay-
ment terms has a near-monopoly on easy credit in the community.66
Thus, despite dissatisfaction, customers will return. The store's purpose
is not to resolve complaints but to keep customers and to prevent their
going elsewhere to complain. It achieves its purpose because of its
market power and its ability either to pacify or to manipulate cus-
tomers.
67
A similar phenomenon may explain some conduct of organizations
like the PSB.68 As the only bureau in the state that hears complaints
about insurance companies, it has a monopoly on knowledge about such
grievances. Perhaps due to its monopoly position, the PSB does not
make complaint information public, and it thereby avoids public
scrutiny of its conduct.
The UAW's mechanism for processing worker complaints69 is the
64. This pattern appeared in the conduct of the Service Area Committee (SAC),
which is funded by the city government of Washington, D.C. SAC brings together com-
munity leaders and city agency personnel to discuss complaints about municipal services.
Greenberg, supra note 33. Because SAC is dependent on the city for its continued existence
and has little influence over resource allocation, it has been a largely inadequate
mechanism for resolving complaints. Weekly meetings are congenial gatherings of well-
intentioned people, all doing their best to solve problems. The informal atmosphere helps
shift the focus from the formal rights of citizens and the duties of government, and
lowers the expectations of community members. Community leaders tend to accept the
rationalizations given by city officials who, in turn, often place blame on the community.
In addition, SAC at times divides the community by causing local leaders to compete for
limited resources. Id.
65. Problems arise even when there are many available third-party complaint handlers,
because consumers cannot always determine which one to consult. Consequently, although
diversity theoretically permits better choices, the consumer is unlikely to distinguish the
truly helpful intermediaries from the crowd of worthless ones, particularly because com-
plaint handlers sometimes change their names, or cease to exist.
66. See Greenberg, supra note 33. See generally D. CAPLovTz, THE POOR PAY MORE
15-30 (1967) (describing practices of retailers in low-income neighborhoods).
67. See Greenberg, supra note 33.
68. Serber, supra note 31. PSB rarely challenges the final arrangement that results
from mediation between the complaining customer and an insurance company. PSB
seldom requests public hearings, although it is authorized to do so. Furthermore, PSB's
bias toward the insurance industry is apparent in its reluctance to launch investigations of
large companies. Id.
69. See Combs-Schilling supra note 29.
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only forum within the union for the expression of worker grievances
about the union; its use is intimately connected to the union's role as
exclusive representative of the workers to the management. The mecha-
nism is cumbersome and unresponsive,70 and workers have disincentives
to complain during economic downswings. 7 1
A striking contrast is offered by the complaint systems of department
stores in one urban area. A study of six systems identified variationsin their organization and concluded that persistent customers gen-
erally obtain satisfaction even if their complaints seem unreasonable.72
A major reason for this could be the face-to-face nature of department
store complaint encounters. Such encounters may give the complainant
an advantage over the individual who complains by mail or telephone.
Another reason for success may be that department stores in competi-
tive markets believe the benefits of keeping the steady customer satis-
fied are worth the costs.
C. The Organization as Con Artist 73
Complaint intermediaries often serve the interests of organizations
complained about by resolving only the most blatant cases of unfair
treatment and by satisfying only the most persistent complainers. The
intermediary diverts all but the real troublemakers and thus diffuses
the anger felt by those whose complaints remain unaddressed. Through
psychological ploys and functional unresponsiveness these intermedi-
aries serve the interests of organizations stimulating complaints.
Third-party intermediaries, in contrast to in-house complaint de-
partments, are particularly well situated to divert and pacify com-
plainants. Third parties give a gloss of legitimacy to complaint han-
dling; their apparent neutrality suggests an impartiality that puts the
70. See note 29 supra. From the perspective of the workers, "[t]he more paperwork
involved, the less likely the men are to use the procedure." Combs-Schilling, supra note
29. There are also pressures from union officials that discourage worker complaints; one
official observed that workers who complain are usually those who "kiss ass" with tile
company and are antiunion. Id. But the most entrenched disincentive derives from the
union's position as the workers' exclusive bargaining representative. Most of a line-
worker's grievances arise against the district committeeman who initially receives the
worker's complaints. Because the worker cannot afford to alienate the committeeman, he
is often forced to "lump" his grievance. Id.
71. Combs-Schilling found that union members used the complaint mechanism less in
a period of economic hardship than in a period of relative economic health. See note 29
supra.
72. Karikas & Rosenwasser, supra note 27.
73. This section draws on Goffman, On Cooling the Mark Out: Some Aspects of
Adaptation to Failure, 15 PsYcH. 451 (1952), which identifies the elements of con artists'
techniques and notes their appearance in other social interactions. For a persuasive account
of the identical structure of con games and all commercial transactions, see A. LEFF,
SWINDLING AND SELLING (1976).
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complainant off guard. As a result, the third party can often convince
the complainant to drop the complaint or to accept a less than satis-
factory resolution.
A kind of symbiosis exists between the organizations that provide
goods and services and third-party complaint handlers. The organiza-
tions are the sources of problems that the third parties process, and the
third parties help the organizations by managing the complaints. Most
third parties are probably unaware of this functional fit; nonetheless,
unresponsive complaint handling often serves the interests of the or-
ganization complained about.
Complaint mechanisms, whether run by third parties or by the
offending organizations, can be unresponsive simply by making com-
plaining difficult. Complex and time-consuming procedures74 that put
the burden on the complainant at each successive step73 are likely to
discourage individuals from bringing or pursuing grievances. Such
obstacles and failure to monitor compliance in "settled" grievances70
may be part of a deliberate effort to placate the complainant until the
grievance is no longer urgent and the complainant is ready to let it go.
In another context, Goffman refers to this strategy as "cooling out."t77
The consumer is initially pacified with a sympathetic response; next, he
is met with delay. As his frustrated expectations fade and his anger
diminishes, the complainant may voluntarily give up. The strategies
are to give the complainant hope in the beginning and then slowly take
it away,78 or to symbolize concern while not accomplishing anything
lasting.79 Other approaches let the complainant vent anger by exploding
at the complaint handler, by making routine telephone calls, and by
completing routine forms. Even if the problem is not resolved, the
complainant feels better because he has done something and has been
74. For example, extensive paperwork is required by the UAW's Public Review Board
procedures. See Combs-Schilling, supra note 29.
75. For example, trade-association consumer action panels transmit a complaint to the
offending organization and take no further action until the consumer contacts the in-
termediary again. Greenberg & Stanton, supra note 26.
76. Action lines, for example, rarely check to see if a complainant has been satisfied.
See N.Y. Times, Mar. 29, 1976, at 31, col. 4.
77. Goffman, supra note 73, at 451-52. "Operators" cool out the "mark" or prospective
victim of planned exploitation; "fa]n attempt is made to define the situation for the
mark in a way that makes it easy for him to accept the inevitable and quietly go home."
Id. at 452.
78. See L. Nader, The Direction of Law and the Development of Extra-Judicial Pro-
cesses in Nation State Societies, in CROss-EXAMINATIONS: ESSAYS t MEMORY OF MAX
GLUCKMAN 93-94 (P. Gulliver ed. 1978) (illustrating "hot-cold treatment" in linguistic
techniques used by telephone supervisor to cool out complainant).
79. The SAC, see note 64 supra, was able to cool out complainants consistently, by
implementing "special projects" designed to demonstrate concern. The projects ultimately
proved unsuccessful. See Greenberg, supra note 33.
1013
The Yale Law Journal
heard. He may even acquire a desired sense of control by viewing the
act of dropping the complaint as his own calculated decision. 0
The complaint processer may actively work to lower the complain-
ant's expectations or to force him to reevaluate his initial sense of in-
justice. In some instances, informal meetings communicate a friendly
atmosphere and an impression that all that can be done to solve the
problem is being done.8' The intermediary actually may mislead the
complainant to believe that all avenues of relief have been exhausted,8 2
or that the offending business practices are reasonable. The BBB, for
example, may incorrectly tell a consumer that unwritten agreements
are not binding and thereby persuade him that he has no basis for
complaint.8 3 Short of dismissing the grievance altogether, the com-
plaint handler often helps the complainant reformulate the grievance
through a process variously called clarification, objectification, or in-
terpretation. 4
By thus conveying problems "strip[ped] of their hostile emotional
content"85 complaint handlers may cause consumers to reevaluate their
initial feelings. In this process, the complaint handler may shift blame
to the complainant.8 0 Further, the complainant may be blamed simply
for complaining; for example, he may be told that he has no cause to
complain. He may watch himself give up in the face of delays, and
conclude it was petty to demand redress for a minor problem. He may
learn to see people who complain as deviants.87 Indeed, in this culture,
people are commonly reluctant to see themselves as complainers.8 This
80. If the complainant feels powerless in seeking satisfaction, he may rationalize his
decision to give up as being at least one act within his own control.
81. Greenberg, supra note 33; see note 64 supra (complainants develop sympathetic
attitudes toward those handling complaints in informal meetings).
82. Eaton, supra note 25.
83. Id. (customer billed for unwanted services was told relief unavailable absent written
contract).
84. See Steele, Fraud, Dispute and the Consumer: Responding to Consumer Complaints,
123 U. PA. L. Rav. 1107, 1156 (1975) (clarification, objectification); Mattice, supra note 34
(interpretative communication).
85. Steele, supra note 84, at 1155.
86. Greenberg describes how a sanitation department representative to a community
complaint forum blamed the trash in vacant lots on the lack of community participation,
when, in reality, the community was unable to discover procedures or times for trash
removal. Greenberg, supra note 33.
87. Combs-Schilling found that reluctance to complain to the UAW's complaint
mechanism was due in part to the negative image union members associated with com-
plaining. Combs-Schilling, supra note 29. The peculiarly American value placed on self-
reliance, see Hsu, American Core Value and National Character, in PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANTHROPOLOGY 248 (F. Hsu ed. 1972), may contribute to the sense that complaining is an
undesirable sign of weakness.
88. See Best & Andreasen, supra note 13, at 720-21 (voicing complaint seems generally
disfavored; complaining to third parties even more disfavored). One commentator has
encouraged people to overcome the negative image of complaining: "Most of all, com-
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attitude accompanies what appears to be a pervasive perceptual handi-
cap: the inability to identify individual complaints as part of an aggre-
gate that calls for systemic response.
D. Failure to See the Forest
Individuals with complaints tend to think that they are alone, even
when numbers of other people have the same problem. Perhaps this
sense and the related reluctance to complain stem from a pattern
linked with industrialization: the atomizing of the social organization
into smaller and smaller consuming units. In addition, the demands of
conformity-an equally powerful part of the American ideology-argue
against identifying oneself as a troublemaker, even as others swallow
the same complaints.89
In the context of complaint mechanisms, individuals tend to accede
to the suggestion that their complaints are petty and not worth
pursuing. 90 Some, willing to see themselves as whistleblowers, may
pursue their claims. Yet the prevailing rate of unsatisfactory resolution
conveys the message that an individual complaint is generally not worth
pressing.91 Reinforcing a sense of individual powerlessness, this failure
rate may contribute to the view that only isolated individuals, as op-
posed to classes of people, have complaints.
One consequence is that only limited numbers of complaints are
voiced, and these complaints do not provide strong pressures for sys-
temic change. Even when large numbers of related complaints are ex-
plainers as individuals should not lose heart. They should learn to suppress that feeling
of embarrassment, the worry about what other people will think of them." Baker, Time
Essay: Louder! The Need to Complain More, TIME, July 3, 1972, at 33.
89. Tocqueville was one of the first to describe American intolerance of deviant be-
havior. See A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 399-40 (J. Meyer & M. Lerner
eds. 1966) (immense power of public opinion in democracy).
90. This article has considered only a few of the possible sources of discouragement.
Given a variety of pressures, a potential complainant may often decide to "exit" rather
than "voice" his grievance. See A. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 105 (1970).
Hirschman argues that decisions about whether to voice or to exit are related to percep-
tions of the probability of influencing a decision, of the calculated advantage of success,
and of the availability of alternative products and services. Id. ;it 37-38, 41. The tendency
to voice also depends on a population's general readiness to complain and on the avail-
ability of mechanisms for communicating complaints cheaply and effectively. Id. at 42-43.
The exercise of voice for handling everyday complaints can be treated as an index of the
degree to which people believe they are powerful, regardless of the actual distribution of
power in society. See L. Nader, Powerlessness in Zapotec and United States Societies, in
THE ANTHROPOLOGY OF POWER (R. Fogelson & R. Adams eds. 1977).
91. Best and Andreasen found that when consumers take their problems to third
parties, they come away satisfied only one-third of the time. Best & Andreasen, supra note
13, at 125; see p. 1007 supra.
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pressed, most complaint handlers are not equipped to perceive or
respond to group problems.92
Few federal agencies, for example, actually have offices responsible
for handling citizen-initiated complaints; 93 few publicize their pro-
cedures or tabulate incoming complaints. 94 One researcher noted that
"[w]ithout statistical records of the nature, categories, frequencies, dis-
tributions, and dispositions of complaints, agencies can hardly be ex-
pected to integrate complaint data into their regular operations or
sustain standards of meritorious performance in their direct relation-
ship with the public." 95 It is not surprising, then, that federal agency
practices are seldom changed in response to complaints.96
Other complaint mechanisms fail to respond to problems in the
aggregate because they are not empowered to do so or because it is not
in their own interest to respond with systemic reforms. Some mech-
anisms, particularly those created as a form of self-regulation, lack any
authority to resolve complaints and simply act as couriers that carry
complaints to the proper party.97 Lacking sufficient ties to the parties
they are supposed to scrutinize, 98 these intermediaries do not have the
structural capacity to respond to problems on an aggregate level. Some
complaint handlers shy away from challenging general practices in
order to garner enough power to achieve success in individual cases. 9
Others, fully aware of their limited authority, may even try to separate
complainants who initially come to them with shared interests. 100 Such
intermediaries hold little authority or power and must depend on
unobtrusive, uncontroversial measures. The grant of little authority is
often due to the presence of interests more powerful than the consumer
or citizen groups supposedly served by complaint programs. 1 1
92. See, e.g., Steele, supra note 84, at 1180-86 (Illinois Consumer Fraud Bureau pri-
marily solves concrete disputes rather than enforcing antifraud laws systemically).
93. One study found that of 64 agencies responding to a questionnaire, 51 reported
having no office specifically responsible for handling citizen-initiated complaints, aside
from formal adjudicative procedures. Rosenblum, Handling Citizen Initiated Coln-
Plaints: An Introductory Study of Federal Agency Procedures and Practices, 26 AD. L.
RFv. 1, 10 (1974).
94. Id. at 10-12.
95. Id. at 12.
96. Id. at 11.
97. For example, the BBB and the complaint panels created by trade associations for
the most part simply carry complaints to the offending business. See note 59 supra.
98. In fact, most trade-association mechanisms represent less than half of their
particular industry. As a result, they are hampered from fulfilling even the limited task
of conveying complaints to the proper parties. See Greenberg & Stanton, supra note 26.
99. The Community Development Group, a private service organization in Wash-
ington, D.C., relies on the influence it gains through informal contacts with public
agency personnel to facilitate certain cases. Therefore it refrains from aggressive challenges
to the agencies. See Greenberg, supra note 33.
100. See note 64 supra.
101. See pp. 1009-11 supra.
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Some complaint mechanisms do not gather or respond to complaints
on an aggregate basis even when they have the power to act systemically.
Media action lines are a prime example. Capable of arousing public
pressure and generating group consciousness, 10 2 media organizations
are fundamentally limited by dependence on audience interest and
advertiser support. These limitations often impede systemic reforms, 103
even though media action lines remain one of the most effective com-
plaint handlers outside of courts.
Another effective complaint handler, a congressman, was free of con-
flicting interests and depended to a great extent on the satisfaction of
complaints for reelection. 104 In a sense, the congressman had a stake in
the continuation of his constituent's problems.10 5 For his own political
survival, it made sense to respond on a case-by-case basis, rather than to
push legislative action. Even in relation to problems potentially shared
by a class of constituents, such as recipients of social security or veterans
benefits, the congressman guaranteed votes by arranging for individ-
ualized relief.
Most intermediaries screen complaints in order to select those that
should be addressed. Although they are meant to serve as alternatives to
law, complaint processors often screen out complaints that do not raise
legal claims. Moreover, complaint handlers sometimes screen com-
plaints according to the personal characteristics of the complainant.
The PSB, for example, pays more attention to the complainant who is
calm, articulate, white, male, and middle-class than to the excited, non-
white, or female complainant. 0 Intermediaries may try to determine
whether the subject of the complaint is "important" or "valid"; they
may reject a case that appears complex and costly to process.
This ad hoc approach to complaint handling permits unfair treat-
ment and fails to stimulate extensive reforms. Secrecy, intimidation,
and distancing mechanisms all protect self-interested groups. Rather
than responding to all complainants, grievance organizations find it
less expensive to treat isolated cases and to allow complainants to drop
102. One complainant reported that she persevered in her complaint about a particular
brand of stove when she received supportive letters from other purchasers following a
newspaper story about her complaint. Citation withheld to protect confidentiality.
103. See p. 1009 supra.
104. Karikas, supra note 30. The need to cultivate votes gave the congressman a direct
incentive to aid complainants; the need to develop helpful local contacts to ensure his
ability to solve complaints gave him reason to lobby in Washington for the local industries
that assisted his constituents. Id.
105. See W. GELLHORN, sukra note 30, at 75-76 (congressional representatives respond
to constituent complaints to help themselves get reelected).
106. Serber, supra note 31 ("deselection" of complaints based on complainants' sex,
race, affluence, articulateness, and degree of calm).
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their grievances or to avoid voicing them; yet the costs of this approach
are real, if sometimes hidden, and they are pervasive.
E. The Costs of Inadequate Complaint Processing
The immediate cost of inadequate complaint processing is borne by
the consumer. If his complaint remains unsatisfied, he continues to
suffer the injustice that stimulated it, as well as cumulative effects of
that injustice. Particularly if the complainant is poor, eveky a small
dollar loss can be serious. Individuals of any income level are not im-
mune to larger costs such as those associated with defects in auto-
mobiles, mobile homes, or nursing home services.
The psychological strains of living with an unreliable product or
service 10 7 are compounded by the emotional toll of the complaint pro-
cess itself. Delays and confrontations accompany even responses to com-
plaints that are finally successful; unsuccessful complainants have to
deal with increased frustration and humiliation, even when "cooled
out" by the intermediary. The consequent sense of powerlessness is a
cost to both the individual and society.108 People who feel powerless
tend to become apathetic and uninvolved. This response short-circuits
the ideal chain of communication that could alert producers of goods
and services to defects and inefficiencies.
As a result, the kind of information loop that could improve products
and services does not develop, and instead an inefficient and unsuc-
cessful process of chain referrals is maintained. The cost of dealing
with an average product or service failure is often as large or larger
than the original purchase price and consumers absorb the greater
part of such costs. Effective complaint resolution would cause firms to
internalize these costs when they make repairs, replacements, or re-
funds. Thus they would have a stronger incentive than they do now to
improve the quality of products and services. In other words, mass re-
dress of individual consumer complaints could have a powerful effect
in improving the quality of American products. Further, institutions
for which complaint handling is only a secondary function could then
devote more time to the performance of their primary tasks.
107. Even though small amounts of money may be involved, the breakdown of a
washing machine can be a real crisis for a family without an automobile. A low-income
individual who refuses to pay a bill for a defective item may face the possibility of
garnishment of his wages. A delay in repairing a set of false teeth has emotional costs
for a patient that exceed the money involved. See note 17 supra.
108. The Small Claims Study Group concluded that small grievances "are the stuff of
everyday life and the outcome of the attempt to redress them has much to do with
whether people feel empowered, active agents controlling their own destinies, or exploited,
victims of forces beyond their control." SMALL CLAIMS STUDY GROUP, supra note 17, at 9.
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Some observers have suggested that the cumulative effect of little
injustices is endemic lawlessness. 109 Even if complaint mechanisms do
not cause disorder and lawlessness, they fail to help remedy the corrup-
tion and ineptitude of landlords, loan sharks, health inspectors, public
service bureaucrats, and private producers. One obvious reform would
be to increase the role of law in addressing the low-profile, petty ex-
ploitation suffered by large segments of the population. But that solu-
tion, most often associated with the small claims court movement, has
also failed to realize stated goals.110
III. Complaints and the Law
Several concluding observations result from the studies of alternatives
to courts that have been described here. First, the relative power be-
tween purchasers and providers is a key variable with respect to the
ability of nonjudicial complaint mechanisms to resolve disputes satis-
factorily."' The fundamental problem that constrains the performance
109. See, e.g., P. SCHRAG, COUNSEL FOR THE DECEIVED (1972). Schrag, a professor at
Columbia Law School, described his attempts to deal with everyday problems in New
York City. He perceived a breakdown in law evidenced by nonenforcement of consumer-
protection legislation.
110. See Yngvesson & Hennessey, supra note 5, at 268 (small claims courts remain in-
effective for poor).
111. The relative bargaining power of the parties can determine the fairness of the
terms of the exchange. The law has already recognized the danger of a "contract of
adhesion," described as
a standardized contract proposed entirely by one party to the transaction for the
acceptance of the other; such a contract, due to the disparity in bargaining power
between the draftsman and the second party, must be accepted or rejected by the
second party on a "take it or leave it" basis, without opportunity for bargaining and
under such conditions that the "adherer" cannot obtain the desired product or
service save by acquiescing in the form agreement.
Steven v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 58 Cal. 2d 862, 377 P.2d 284, 27 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1962)
(citations omitted).
Courts have used the unconscionability clause of U.C.C. § 2-302 to invalidate onerous
provisions of such contracts. See, e.g., Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d
445 (D.C. Cir. 1965); Zabriski Chevrolet, Inc. v. Smith, 99 N.J. Super. 441, 240 A.2d 195
(Super. Ct. Law Div. 1968). As one critic noted, however, contract remedies secured
through adjudication do not address the "inefficiencies and inequities of exorbitant prices
and oppressive clauses" of form contracts. Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard
Forms, 64 CALIF. L. Rav. 1151, 1183 (1976). Nor are judicial remedies responsive to those
who do not sue because they do not expect relief or to those who decide not to purchase
because of unfair contract terms. Id. at 1180.
Unequal bargaining power is especially troubling when the seller uses vastly unequal
bargaining power to disclaim warranties or limit remedies. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield
Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 404, 161 A.2d 69, 95 (1960) ("The lawmakers did not authorize
the automobile manufacturer to use its grossly disproportionate bargaining power to
... impose on the ordinary buyer, who in effect has no real freedom of choice, the grave
danger to himself and others that attends the sale of such a dangerous instrumentality as
a defectively made automobile.") Legislative efforts to protect consumers against such
harm include 15 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2312 (1976), which requires that warranties for con-
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of alternative complaint mechanisms today derives from their inability
to compensate adequately for the ineffective bargaining position of the
individual who confronts large corporations and government bureau-
cracies. Many complaint handlers reinforce these unequal bargaining
positions; others are powerless to reorder them. Disputes between
people of unequal power are unlikely to be settled fairly by mediation
or arbitration unless the force of law is available as a last resort.112
Courts should be available, especially in cases in which the parties
have unequal power; parties with relatively equal power are more
likely to resolve disputes without the aid of the judiciary. Access to
court for parties of unequal power could itself shape opportunities for
satisfactory settlement without the exercise of legal authority. Even
now, settlements of claims that could have been resolved legally al-
most universally reflect the level of awards available in small claims
court.1 3 Expanding judicial relief for minor claims could lead to better
nonjudicial solutions.
A second observation is that no matter how alternative complaint
mechanisms are strengthened, their case-by-case approach cannot rem-
edy all the harms identified by consumer and citizen complaints. Ex-
panding automatic return policies, simplifying small claims court, and
extending consumer arbitration in the shadow of the courtroom door
are reforms that would provide some limited relief, but they would
not contribute to the identification of widespread problems or to the
prevention of future disputes. Only when numerous complaints are
viewed together can a pattern emerge-for example, a pattern of auto-
mobile-repair fraud. Handling such complaints in the aggregate may
lead to effective preventive reforms; it may also be less expensive than
a case-by-case approach. Aggregate solutions are available through class-
action litigation and regulation,114 yet business and government, for
the most part, do not construct aggregate solutions to classes of com-
plaints and instead persist in approaching each grievance individually.
Ways must be found to compensate for the perceptual handicap that
sumer products be more readily understandable and enforceable by the consumer. This
statute ultimately may fail to serve consumer interests because its provisions could en-
courage sellers to issue oral warranties that are difficult to enforce or to issue limited
rather than full warranties. Hymson, The Magnuson-Moss Warranty-Federal Trade Com-
mission Improvement Act: Should the Consumer Rejoice? 15 J. FAA1. L. 77 (1976).
112. Giving parties access to court ensures that they have an effective technique to
resolve their dispute; access may also influence the way in which the same problems are
resolved out of court. See Lempert, Mobilizing Private Law: An Introductory Essay, 11
LAW & Soc'y Rav. 173, 173-74 (1976).
113. L. Nader & Shugart, in No Access to Law (chapter 2, untitled).
114. But see note 4 supra (noting barriers to class-action litigation and limitations of
regulation).
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so often restricts problemsolving to this case-by-case approach. 115 One
technique would start with the recognition that, as in most cultures,
the most powerful tool of law reform is public opinion. The mass
nature of this society requires the use of innovative techniques to in-
form and rally public opinion. Although seldom employed for this
purpose, existing communication technologies could be used to pub-
licize the records of varied complaint organizations. Such records could
be published; complaints could be metered or banked.116 Further, if
all public and private complaint organizations were required to have
open records, strategies for aggregate reform could be formulated more
easily.
A third observation is an initial response to the question posed at
the beginning of this article: are problems of access to law causing a
serious deficiency in our justice system? The answer is yes. Estimates
of the economic and psychological costs of unattended complaints can
only hint at the loss to society that results when little injustices ac-
cumulate without judicial relief. Yet the courts are unable to provide
complete justice even to those who enter their doors. A comparison of
two trial courts in California between 1890 and 1970 concludes that the
function of courts has changed from dispute settlement to routine ad-
ministration." 7 The institutions that have replaced the courts, some of
which have been described here, do not operate very well for the power-
less.
Disputing without law is not a very satisfactory experience for most
consumers and citizens in this country, yet it is unlikely that the force
of law can be marshaled to address "little injustices" unless they are
reconceptualized as collective harms. For official action in that direction
to have any likelihood of yielding more than symbolic victories, an
active and vital grass-roots citizen and consumer movement must be
encouraged.
115. See pp. 1015-18 supra.
116. L. Nader & Singer, Dispute Resolution . . . Law in the Future: What are the
Choices? 51 CAL. ST. B.J. 281, 314 (1976).
117. Friedman & Percival, A Tale of Two Courts: Litigation in Alameda and San
Benito Counties, 10 LAw & Soc'y Rav. 267, 302 (1976).
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